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The  social  value  of risk  reduction  (SVRR)  is  the  marginal  social  value  of reducing  an indi-
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the young  should  take  priority  but  income  should  make  no difference.
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. Introduction
Is it socially more important to save the lives of younger
ndividuals, than to save the lives of the old? It seems
ard to dispute that younger individuals should take pri-
rity with respect to lifesaving measures to the extent that
ge inversely correlates with life expectancy remaining,
t least if the younger and older individuals are similarly
ituated with respect to the other determinants of well-
eing (health, income, etc.).5 If Anne is similarly situated
o Bob, except for being younger, and a given reduction in
nne’s current mortality risk produces a larger increase in
er life expectancy than the same reduction in Bob’s, the
isk reduction for Anne seems socially more valuable.
But some have argued that the young should take pri-
rity with respect to lifesaving measures, and health policy
ore generally, on fairness grounds—not merely on the
tilitarian basis that lifesaving measures directed at the
oung tend to yield a greater increase in life expectancy
nd expected lifetime well-being. Harris (1985, p. 91) intro-
uced the idea of “fair innings” into the public health
iterature: “The fair innings argument requires that every-
ne be given an equal chance to have a fair innings, to
each the appropriate threshold but, having reached it, they
ave received their entitlement. The rest of their life is the
ort of bonus which may  be canceled when this is neces-
ary to help others reach the threshold.” Others who  have
ndorsed some version of the fair innings concept include
illiams (1997); Daniels (1988); Lockwood (1988); Nord
2005); Bognar (2008, 2015); Ottersen (2013). The notion
hat the young should receive priority with respect to life-
aving measures is reflected, not merely in the academic
iterature on fair innings, but also in surveys of citizen pref-
rences regarding health policy. (Bognar, 2008; Dolan et al.,
005; Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2012).
Bognar (2015, p. 254) uses the following thought exper-
ment to crystallize the fair innings concept.
[Y]ou have only one drug and there are two patients who
need it. The only difference between the two patients is
their age. . . . You have to choose between saving: (C) a
20-year old patient who will live for 10 more years if
she gets the drug; or (D) a 70-year old patient who will
live for 10 more years if she gets the drug.
Both patients would spend the remaining ten years of
their life in good health. So there is no difference in
expected benefit. The only difference is how much they
have already lived when they receive the benefit.
. . . [According to] the fairness-based argument for the
fair innings view, you should . . . prefer C to D.
5 More precisely, this proposition is hard to dispute for those who
ndorse welfarism: who  believe that governmental policies should be eval-
ated in light of the sum total and distribution of individual well-being.
y  contrast, non-welfarists might argue that everyone has an equal right
o  life, and that governments should not differentially value lifesaving on
he basis of any individual characteristics (including age).
his Article presupposes welfarism. Welfarism is the dominant ethical
iew in economics, and both of the assessment frameworks we  consider
n  this article—the social-welfare-function framework and benefit-cost-
nalysis—are versions of welfarism. (On welfarism, see generally Adler
2012, 2019).)
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We’ll build on the suggestion of Bognar (2015) in using
the term “fair innings” to mean the following: as between a
policy that produces a given gain in expected lifetime well-
being for a younger person, and an otherwise-identical
policy that produces the same gain in expected lifetime
well-being for an older person, it is ethically better for
society to undertake the first policy.
While fair innings in this sense is an intuitively appeal-
ing idea, it is not supported by the current economic
literature regarding the valuation of lifesaving. That lit-
erature generally focuses on benefit-cost analysis (BCA),
which is the dominant tool in governmental practice for
assessing fatality risk-reduction policies. The methodol-
ogy of BCA does not support the idea that gains to the
young are socially more valuable than equal gains for the
old.6
In this Article, we examine the fair innings concept
as part of a broader analysis of the use of social welfare
functions (SWFs) to value risk reduction, and a com-
parison of the SWF  framework to BCA. We  show, in
particular, that “prioritarian” SWFs place greater weight on
gains to expected lifetime well-being accruing to younger
rather than older individuals. We thus demonstrate that
the fair innings concept has a rigorous basis in welfare
economics—specifically in the SWF  framework, not BCA.
BCA appraises government policies by summing indi-
viduals’ monetary equivalents—an individual’s monetary
equivalent for a policy being the amount of money she
is willing to pay or accept for it, relative to the status
quo. In turn, the value per statistical life (VSL) is the
concept that captures how BCA values fatality risk reduc-
tion. VSL is the marginal rate of substitution between
an individual’s material resources (wealth, income, or
consumption) and survival probability in a period. Put dif-
ferently, VSL is the coefficient that translates a change in
someone’s survival probability into a monetary equivalent.
Individual i’s willingness to pay for a small improve-
ment pi in survival probability is approximately VSLi ×
pi.
BCA, although now widespread, is controversial. A
different framework for evaluating policy—one that has
strong roots in economic theory and plays a major role
in various bodies of scholarship within economics—is
the social welfare function (SWF). The SWF  framework
measures policy impacts in terms of interpersonally
comparable well-being, not monetary equivalents. Each
possible outcome is a vector of individual well-being num-
bers, and a given policy is a probability distribution over
such vectors. The SWF, abbreviated W(·), assigns a social
value to a policy P, W(P), in light of the probability distri-
bution over outcomes and, thus, well-being vectors that P
corresponds to. On the SWF  framework, see generally Adler
(2012, 2019); Blackorby et al. (2005, chs. 2–4); Bossert and
Weymark (2004); Weymark (2016).In previous work (Adler et al. (2014)), we analyzed the
application of the SWF  framework to risk policies and com-
pared how it values risk reduction to VSL. The key construct



























































we address here. One issue that quickly became salient as
Covid-19 cases exploded was risk allocation. Which Covid-
19 patients should take priority in receiving scarce medical
7 The utilitarian SVRR also does not display Priority for the Young and
Ratio Priority for the Young, but this is true by definition—since these
properties are defined relative to a utilitarian baseline. See Section 3.
8 The properties of the ex ante prioritarian and ex post prioritarian.D. Adler, M.  Ferranna, J.K. Hammitt, and N. Treich 
n our analysis was the social value of risk reduction (SVRR).
he SVRR for individual i is the social value per unit of
isk reduction to individual i, calculated for a marginal




, and the change in the SWF  that occurs
ith a change pi in individual i’s survival probability pi is
pproximately SVRRi × pi.
Using the simple, one-period model that is often
mployed in the literature on VSL, Adler et al. (2014)
alculated SVRRi for different types of SWFs: the utili-
arian, “ex ante prioritarian,” and “ex post prioritarian”
WFs. (Utilitarianism ranks outcomes by summing well-
eing numbers, while prioritarianism does so by summing
 strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation of
ell-being, thereby giving priority to those at lower well-
eing levels. The idea of utilitarianism dates back hundreds
f years to the writings of Jeremy Bentham; prioritari-
nism is a more recent concept, pioneered by the moral
hilosopher Derek Parfit (2000). The ex ante and ex post
rioritarian SWFs are two distinct specifications of prior-
tarianism for the case of uncertainty.) We  analyzed the
omparative statics of SVRRi and VSLi with respect to indi-
idual wealth and baseline risk.
The current Article significantly expands the analysis of
dler et al. (2014). We  use a much richer model of individ-
al resources and survival. An individual’s life has multiple
eriods, up to a maximum T (e.g., 100 years). Each individ-
al is characterized by a lifetime risk profile (a probability of
urviving to the end of each period, conditional on her being
live at its beginning); a lifetime income profile (an income
mount which she earns in each period if she survives to its
nd); and a current age. This multi-period setup permits a
ore nuanced analysis of SVRRi and VSLi. In particular, we
an now examine the comparative statics of SVRRi and VSLi
ith respect to an individual’s age as well as with respect
o (past, present and future) income and baseline fatality
isk.
The SWF  framework is widely used in some areas of
conomics, such as optimal tax theory and climate eco-
omics. (Overviews of the use of the SWF  framework in
hese two literatures are provided by Tuomala (2016) and
otzen and van den Bergh (2014) respectively.) It is also
mployed in health economics, with the SWF  here typi-
ally being applied to a population characterized in terms of
ongevity and health states. (Bleichrodt et al., 2004; Dolan,
998; Hougaard et al., 2013; Østerdal, 2005; Williams,
997.) However, little research has been undertaken apply-
ng the SWF  framework to the policy domain of fatality risk
eduction—a major arena of governmental policymaking
Graham, 2008). We  aim to make headway in exploring this
mportant and understudied topic, and to raise its profile
n the research community.
Section 2 sets forth the model and the SWFs we will con-
ider. Section 3 analyzes the comparative statics of SVRRi
nd VSLi with respect to age. We  provide a formal state-
ent of the fair innings concept, via properties which we
erm “Priority for the Young” and “Ratio Priority for the
oung.” We  show that the ex ante prioritarian SVRRi and ex
ost prioritarian SVRRi both display Priority for the Young
nd indeed the logically stronger property of “Ratio Prior-
3
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ity for the Young.” By contrast, VSLi does not have either
property.7
Section 4 analyzes the comparative statics of SVRRi and
VSLi with respect to income and baseline risk. Section 5
undertakes an empirical exercise, based on the U.S. popu-
lation survival curve and income distribution, to illustrate
the SVRRi concept and to estimate the impact of age and
income on SVRRi and VSLi.
Our headline results are as follows. First, we demon-
strate that the SWF  framework—by contrast with
BCA—provides a rigorous basis for the “fair innings”
concept. The social value of risk reduction (SVRR), as
calculated using an ex ante or ex post prioritarian SWF,
gives extra social weight to risk reduction for younger
individuals above and beyond the additional weight they
receive in virtue of greater life expectancy remaining. (In
an important article, Williams (1997) proposes to oper-
ationalize the “fair innings” concept via a non-utilitarian
SWF  applied to individuals’ quality-adjusted life expectan-
cies; but Williams does not develop this proposal formally,
as we  do here.)
Second, we  show that the manner in which BCA val-
ues risk reduction is significantly different from the SWF
framework, regardless of which SWF  is used (utilitarian, ex
ante prioritarian, ex post prioritarian). These differences
are multifold. The prioritarian SVRRs display Priority for the
Young and Ratio Priority for the Young, while VSL does not.
Further, as established in Section 4, the comparative statics
of VSL with respect to income and baseline risk are different
not only from the ex ante and ex post prioritarian SVRRs,
but also from the utilitarian SVRR. Finally, Section 5 demon-
strates that these analytic differences may  be empirically
quite significant. In particular, VSL increases much more
steeply with income in each age group than the utilitarian
SVRR, while the prioritarian SVRRs are flat or decrease with
income.8
The text of the Article sets forth our analytic apparatus,
defines relevant concepts, states our analytic results (as
numbered propositions), and interprets these findings or
explains the intuition behind them. However, so as to limit
the length of the Article and increase readability, we do not
include proofs of these propositions in the text. Instead,
proofs are provided in an on-line Appendix.
This Article was  drafted prior to the coronavirus pan-
demic of 2020. How to choose fatality-risk-reduction
policies was  an important topic before the pandemic, and
will remain so after the pandemic abates. But the terrible
events of 2020 underscore the significance of the questionsSVRRs depend, to some extent, on which concave transformation func-
tion is used—embodying the degree of priority for the worse off. Thus, in
Section 5, the prioritarian SVRRs with a moderately concave transforma-
tion function are flat with income, while the prioritarian SVRRs with a



















































of myopic thinking on the individual’s part. Given length
constraints, we  do not here analyze SVRRi with a multi-
course would be to conceptualize pi(t) as the currently known conditional
probability of i’s surviving period t, given that she is alive at the beginning
of that period. On this approach, pi(t) = 1 for t < Ai , since i knows she has.D. Adler, M. Ferranna, J.K. Hammitt, and N. Treich 
quipment that would reduce the risk of dying from the
isease, such as ventilators? Which uninfected individu-
ls should go to the front of the line in receiving scarce
rotective equipment, such as N95 masks? The SWF  frame-
ork provides a systematic methodology for answering
uch questions. It gives guidance in determining how the
ocial value of reducing an individual’s fatality risk (in these
ases, her risk of dying from Covid-19) should vary, or not,
epending upon her age, income, and other characteristics.
nderstanding these relative social valuations, for three
ajor SWFs—utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post
rioritarian—is precisely the topic of this Article.
. Conceptual framework
.1. Model of the population
There is a population of N individuals. The life of a given
ndividual i is divided into periods 1, 2, . . .,  t, . . .,  T, with T
he maximum number of periods that any individual can
ive. Each individual is characterized by an age, risk profile,
nd income profile, to be explained momentarily.
Calendar time is divided into the present time (also
eferred to as the “current” time), earlier times (“the past”),
nd later times (“the future”). This enables us to endow
ach individual i with an “age,” denoted as Ai. We  assume
hat individuals’ periods are synchronized, such that the
resent time is the beginning of some period for each of the
 individuals. Ai is the number of the present period for
ndividual i. For example, if Betty has already lived 4 peri-
ds, and the present time is the beginning of period 5 of
etty’s life, then ABetty = 5, i.e., Betty’s “age” is 5.9 Ai ≤ T and
e also assume that Ai ≥ 2.10
Death and survival are conceptualized as follows. Con-
ider a given individual i and some period t in her life.
ssuming the individual is alive at the beginning of period
, she may  either die before the period ends, or survive to
he end of the period (equivalently, be alive at the begin-
ing of the following period). Let pi(t) denote individual i’s
robability of surviving to the end of period t, conditional
n being alive at the beginning of period t. We’ll gener-
lly refer to pi(t) as a “survival probability.” Individual i is
haracterized by a vector of such probabilities, one for each
eriod up to T—for short, her “risk profile.”
In our model, these probabilities do not change as the
ndividual ages. Individual i is endowed at birth with sur-
ival probabilities for each period t = 1, . . .,  T; and pi(t) at
he present time, the beginning of period Ai, is this at-birth
robability.11
Let i(t; t*) denote individual i’s probability of surviv-
ng to the end of period t of her life, conditional on being
9 Note that our definition of individual i’s “age” as Ai is slightly different
rom the colloquial use of the term “age.” If Betty is at the beginning of
eriod 5 of her life, then (colloquially) we would say that her age is 4, not
.  However, we  need a natural-language term to refer to Ai , and “age” is
he  most natural choice. The issue here is purely semantic. Referring to Ai
s individual i’s “age” rather than “age plus one” makes no difference to
ur analytic results.
10 See below, note 22, for an explanation why we assume that Ai ≥ 2.
11 A different way  to model an individual’s fatality risks over the life
4
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alive at the beginning of period t*. In particular, i(t; Ai) is
individual i’s probability of surviving to the end of period
t of her life, conditional on being alive at the beginning of
period Ai—that is, her probability of surviving to the end
of period t, conditional on her current age (Ai). If t < Ai,
i(t; Ai) = 1. If t ≥ Ai, i(t; Ai) =
∏t
s=Aipi(s).
Finally, let i(t; t*) denote individual i’s probability of
living exactly t periods, conditional on being alive at the
beginning of period t*. That is, i(t; t*) is the probability,
conditional on being alive at the beginning of period t*, of
surviving through the end of period t and then dying before
the end of the next period. In particular, i(t; Ai) is the indi-
vidual’s probability of living exactly t periods, conditional
on being alive at the beginning of period Ai—conditional on
her current age.
If t < (Ai − 1), i(t; Ai) = 0. If t = (Ai −1), i(t; Ai) is the
individual’s probability, conditional on her current age, of
not surviving the current period and instead living exactly
(Ai − 1) periods. That is i(Ai − 1; Ai) = 1 − pi(Ai). Finally, if
t ≥ Ai, we  have that: i(t; Ai) = i(t; Ai)(1 − pi(t + 1)).
The earnings process is as follows: if an individual sur-
vives to the end of period t, she earns an income amount
yi(t) > 0. Individual i, thus, is characterized by a vector of
incomes, (yi(1), . . .,  yi(T))—her “income profile.” An individ-
ual’s income profile, like her risk profile, is (in our model)
given to the individual at birth and does not change as she
ages.12
Period consumption, like period income, is modelled
as occurring only if the individual survives to the end of
the period. An individual’s consumption during period t,
if she survives to the end of period t, is denoted ci(t). We
assume “myopic” consumption: ci(t) = yi(t). The individual
consumes in each period whatever she earns then, rather
than saving earnings for future consumption or financing
consumption by borrowing against future earnings.
“Myopic” consumption might occur because of imper-
fect markets—the individual lacks access to the financial
instruments enabling her to save and borrow—or becausesurvived to the beginning of period Ai . Modelling fatality risks this way
would not change our results, since the formulas for the utilitarian, ex ante
prioritarian, and ex post prioritarian SVRRs, and for VSL, do not depend
upon past survival probabilities; and because currently known survival
probabilities for the present and future periods are the same as at-birth
survival probabilities (see Appendix).
We assume 0 < pi(t) < 1 for all t such that 1 < t ≤ T; and that pi(1) =
1.  As discussed below, note 22, we assume that Ai ≥ 2 for all i—that is,
that every individual has survived to the end of the first period of her
life—and to ensure this we assume pi(1) = 1. Finally, pi(T + 1) = 0. (This is
the probability that i survives one more period, given that she has survived
to the end of period T, the maximum number of possible periods.)
12 Of course, if t and t* are distinct periods, then it may well be the case
that yi(t) /= yi(t*). But the profile of incomes (yi(1), . . .,  yi(T))—specifying,
for each period, what the individual will earn at the end of that period if
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eriod model and individual saving and borrowing. This is
n important topic for future research.13
Individuals have a common lifetime utility function U(·),
efined as the discounted sum of period utility. Let u(·) be
he common period utility function and  = 1/(1 + ϕ), ϕ
 0 the constant utility discount rate. Ui(s) denotes the




tu(yi(t)).14 We  assume that u(·) is twice dif-
erentiable and that u′(·) > 0, u′ ′(·) < 0.
Note that the above formula for lifetime utility includes
 term for a given period t iff15 the individual survives to
he end of the period. If she doesn’t survive to the end of a
iven period, her period utility is zero. Further, our analysis
resupposes that, if i does survive to the end of period t,
ith consumption ci(t) in that period, u(ci(t)) > 0. Note that
f u(ci(t)) < 0, increasing pi(t) may  have the effect of lowering
’s expected lifetime utility. We  wish to focus here on the
ase in which risk reduction is beneficial to individuals—not
he unusual case in which it may  be harmful.16
We  use Vi to denote the expected lifetime utility of
ndividual i, given his age, risk profile, and income profile.
i =
∑T
t=Ai−1i(t; Ai)Ui(t). This formula for Vi is straight-
orward. Given that i is alive at the beginning of period
i, the possible lifespans for him are (Ai −1), Ai, . . .,  T.
he immediately preceding formula aggregates over these
ossible lifespans, calculating the lifetime utility for each
ossible lifespan and multiplying each possible lifetime
tility Ui(t) by its probability. A different formula for Vi,








ula takes each period of i’s life, 1, . . .,  T; calculates the
iscounted period utility for that period; multiplies by the
robability of i surviving to the end of that period, con-
itional on his current age;17 and sums up over all the
eriods.
.2. Social welfare functions (SWFs)
We’ll use the term “policy” to mean some course of
ction or inaction by the government. The status quo,
herefore, is a “policy”: government chooses not to change
ndividuals’ risk profiles or income profiles. A policy
ntervention, relative to the status quo, is also a “pol-
cy”: government changes individuals’ risk profiles and/or
ncome profiles, specifically by changing present survival
robabilities, future survival probabilities, present income
mounts, and/or future income amounts. An individual’s
isk profile or income profile with a given policy P is
enoted with the superscript “P.” Thus pP
i
(t) is i’s survival
13 In the working paper upon which the current Article is based, we do
ddress the topic of SVRRi with saving and borrowing, although do not
ndertake a comprehensive analysis. See Adler et al. (2019).
14 Since consumption occurs at the end of each period, the discount rate
 is raised to the power t rather than (t−1).
15 “iff” means “if and only if.”
16 In order to ensure that u(ci(t)) > 0 for all i and t, we  assume that there
s  a “subsistence” level of consumption czero such that u(czero) = 0 and that
i(t) > czero for all i, t.
17 As noted above, if t < Ai , then i(t; Ai) = 1.
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probability in period t with policy P and yP
i
(t) is her period
t income with policy P.
The SWF  framework has three components: an interper-
sonally comparable well-being measure, which converts
each possible outcome (a possible social consequence) into
a vector of well-being numbers, one for each of the persons
in the population; a rule for ranking well-being vectors; and
an uncertainty module, namely a procedure for applying
the rule to policies understood as probability distributions
across outcomes. (Adler, 2012, 2019.) If individuals have a
common utility function, then the well-being measure can
be equated with that utility function (which is the approach
we follow here). (Adler, 2019, ch. 3, app. D.) In what follows,
we use “SWF” to mean the combination of a rule for rank-
ing well-being vectors and an uncertainty module for that
rule.
We consider three SWFs: the utilitarian SWF, the ex ante
prioritarian SWF, and the ex post prioritarian SWF. Each
assigns a score (a real number) to a given policy P, and ranks
policies in the order of these scores. We’ll denote the utili-
tarian SWF  as WU(·), the ex ante prioritarian SWF  as WEAP(·),
and the ex post prioritarian SWF  as WEPP(·)—or, more com-
pactly, as WU , WEAP , and WEPP . We’ll use W(·) as a generic
term to indicate any SWF, with W(·) then specified as WU ,
WEAP , WEPP , or as some other SWF.18
The utilitarian rule ranks well-being vectors accord-
ing to the sum of well-being. The standard procedure for
applying the utilitarian rule under uncertainty is to sum
individuals’ expected well-being. This yields the utilitarian
SWF.





The prioritarian rule ranks well-being vectors accord-
ing to the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly concave
transformation of individual well-being. Let g(·) denote
some strictly increasing and strictly concave function.
By summing g(·)-transformed well-being numbers, the
prioritarian rule has the effect of giving greater weight
to well-being changes affecting worse-off individuals.
Assume that in well-being vector w a better-off individual
is at well-being level wH , and a worse-off individual is at
well-being level wL , with wH > wL . Let w > 0 be a change in
well-being. Well-being vector w*  is identical to w,  except
that the better-off person is at well-being level wH + w.
Well-being vector w** is identical to w,  except that the
worse-off person is at well-being level wL + w. The util-
itarian rule is indifferent between w*  and w**, while the
prioritarian rule prefers w**, by virtue of the strict concav-
ity of g(·). It prefers to give a fixed increment in well-being
to a worse-off person rather than to a better-off one.
The two main approaches to applying the prioritarian
rule under uncertainty are ex ante prioritarianism and ex
18 SVRRi for a given W(·) is the partial derivative of W(·) with respect
to  i’s current survival probability. See Section 2.3. In order for this partial
derivative to be well-defined, the SWF  needs to be score-based, as are
WU , WEAP , and WEPP (assigning a real number to each policy and ranking
policies in the order of those numbers), and indeed differentiable, as are






















































Definition 2. The Social Value of Risk Reduction
(SVRRi): SVRRi for a given SWF  W(·) is the partial derivative.D. Adler, M. Ferranna, J.K. Hammitt, and N. Treich 
ost prioritarianism.19 (Adler, 2012, ch. 7; Adler, 2019, app.
; Adler et al., 2014.) Ex ante prioritarianism assigns a score
o a given policy by calculating expected well-being for
ach individual; applying the transformation function, g(·),
o each individual’s expected well-being; and then sum-
ing up these g(·)-transformed well-being expectations.
x post prioritarianism assigns a score to a given policy by
aking the expected value, for each individual, of her g(·)-
ransformed well-being; and summing up these expected
ransformed well-being numbers.20 In a nutshell, the ex
nte prioritarian formula is the sum across individuals of
ransformed expected well-being, while the ex post prior-
tarian formula is the sum across individuals of expected
ransformed well-being.
Ex ante and ex post prioritarianism each have a cen-
ral place in the literature on prioritarianism because each
as axiomatic advantages compared to the other. It can
e shown that no procedure for applying the prioritarian
ule under uncertainty can satisfy both the ex ante Pareto
xioms, and a very plausible axiom of stochastic domi-
ance. Ex ante prioritarianism satisfies the ex ante Pareto
xioms, but violates stochastic dominance; ex post priori-
arianism satisfies stochastic dominance, but violates the
x ante Pareto axioms.21 (Utilitarianism satisfies the ex
nte Pareto axioms and stochastic dominance, but lacks the
xtra weighting for the worse off that is characteristic of
rioritarianism, and that its proponents find to be ethically
ttractive.)
In the model here, the formulas for ex ante and ex post
rioritarianism are as follows.





), with g(·) a strictly increasing and strictly con-
ave function.







(t; Ai)g(UPi (t)), with g(·) a strictly increas-
ng and strictly concave function.
The utilitarian SWF  is a specific SWF  (a specific formula
or ranking policies as a function of individuals’ ages, risk
rofiles, and income profiles) while the ex ante prioritar-
an SWF  and ex post prioritarian SWF  are, each, families
19 The choice between ex ante and ex post approaches to equity has also
een  discussed in health economics. (Bleichrodt, 1997).
20 The rule for ex post prioritarianism is often stated in a different way:
s  the expected value of the sum of individuals’ transformed well-being.
ut this is mathematically equivalent to the rule stated in the text: the
xpected value of the sum of individuals’ transformed well-being equals
he sum of individuals’ expected transformed well-being. (Adler, 2019,
pp. J).
21 The ex ante Pareto axioms are Ex Ante Pareto Indifference and Ex
nte Strong Pareto. Ex Ante Pareto Indifference: If each person’s expected
ell-being with policy P is equal to her expected well-being with policy
*,  then P and P* are equally good. Ex Ante Strong Pareto: If each person’s
xpected well-being with policy P is greater than or equal to her expected
ell-being with policy P*,  and at least one person’s expected well-being
s strictly greater, then P is better than P*.  Stochastic Dominance: If, for
ach possible state of nature, the well-being vector produced by policy P
n  that state is better than the well-being vector produced by policy P*,
hen  P is better than P*.  On the axiomatic properties of utilitarianism and
rioritarianism under uncertainty, see generally Adler, 2012 ch. 7; Adler,
019 ch. 3–4, apps. I-L.
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of SWFs. The choice of a particular strictly increasing and
strictly concave g(·) defines a specific WEAP and WEPP . Our
analysis will be generic, holding true for any g(·). We do
assume that g(·) is twice differentiable, so that g′(·) > 0 and
g′ ′(·) < 0.22
Note that all three SWFs are defined in terms of indi-
viduals’ lifetime well-being. WU calculates each individual’s
expected lifetime well-being,  and sums across individu-
als. WEAP calculates each individual’s transformed expected
lifetime well-being,  and sums across individuals. WEPP
calculates each individual’s expected transformed lifetime
well-being, and sums across individuals. The application of
SWFs to lifetime well-being has a strong ethical justifica-
tion. (Adler, 2012, ch. 6). While much of the SWF  literature
uses one-period models for reasons of tractability, there is
also a significant body of work using multiperiod or life-
time numbers as the input to an SWF.23 (For discussion of
this literature, see Adler (2012, p. 245); Boadway (2012, pp.
86–106); Tuomala (2016, pp. 360–64).)
2.3. The social value of risk reduction (SVRR)
We’ll use the “O” superscript to denote an individual’s
status quo income and risk profiles: piO(t) is individual i’s
status quo survival probability for period t and yiO(t) her
status quo income for period t.
Assume that government enacts a policy intervention,
relative to the status quo, at the beginning of the current
period. Among other effects, the policy may change individ-
ual i’s current survival probability. Let pi be this change:
i’s current survival probability in the status quo is piO(Ai)
and her current survival probability after the intervention
is piO(Ai) + pi.
We can now define SVRRi, which will be useful in under-
standing the impact of this policy intervention on social
welfare.∂W
∂pi(Ai)
evaluated at i’s status quo risk and income profile.24
22 The “Atkinson” family of g(·) functions—g(u) = (1−)−1u1− ,  > 0, 
/=  1; and g(u) = ln u if  = 1—have attractive axiomatic properties and are
regularly used in the economic literature on prioritarianism. See Adler
(2012, ch. 5). (Indeed our empirical exercise in Section 5 uses an Atkinson
g(·)  function.) The Atkinson g(·) is such that g(0) is undefined for  ≥ 1. In
order for our analysis to accommodate the possibility that g(0) is unde-
fined, we  assume that Ai ≥ 2 for all i. (Note that the expression for the
ex  post prioritarian SWF  in Definition 1c includes the g(·) value of indi-
vidual i’s lifetime well-being if she lives exactly (Ai − 1) periods. If Ai = 1,
the individual’s lifetime well-being if she lives exactly Ai − 1 periods is 0.)
Because the period length can be arbitrarily short, the assumption that Ai
≥ 2 is not significantly restrictive.
23 Similarly, while much empirical work on income inequality focuses
on annual income, there is also a significant body of work that looks at
the inequality of lifetime income. See, for example, Bönke et al. (2015);
Bowlus and Robin (2004); Guvenen et al. (2017); Huggett et al. (2011);
Nilsen et al. (2012).










three SWFs are additively separable across individuals, ∂W
∂pi (Ai )
can be
expressed just as a function of i’s risk and income profiles; the value of
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By the total differential approximation from calculus,
he change in social welfare resulting from pi is approxi-
ately SVRRi × pi.25
Intuitively, SVRRi is the change in social welfare per
nit of current risk reduction for individual i, as calculated
or a marginal such reduction. To be sure, a governmen-
al policy intervention may  well have effects other than
hanging individuals’ current survival probabilities. It may
lso change their survival probabilities in future periods.
nd a risk-reduction intervention will surely have costs,
hich will be reflected in a change to individuals’ current
nd/or future incomes. The total effect of a policy interven-
ion on social welfare will be approximately equal to the
um, across individuals, of SVRRi × pi plus correspond-
ng terms for changes to future survival probabilities and to
ncomes. SVRRi captures that portion of a policy interven-
ion’s total impact on social welfare that results from the
hange to individual i’s current survival probability.
Further, by comparing SVRRi to SVRRj , for two individu-
ls i and j—as we do below—we can determine the relative
ocial impact of risk reductions for the two. Consider a
hange p  to someone’s current survival probability. That
isk change, if accruing to individual i, results in a change
f social welfare by approximately SVRRi × p.  If accruing
o individual j, it results in a change of social welfare by
pproximately SVRRj × p.  Thus (for a small p) the first
ocial welfare change is larger than/smaller than/equal to
he second iff SVRRi is larger than/smaller than/equal to
VRRj .
SVRRi is defined (Definition 2) as the partial derivative of
he SWF  with respect to individual i’s current survival prob-
bility, with this partial derivative evaluated at individual
’s status quo risk and income profiles. This reference to the
tatus quo doesn’t limit the generality of the definition. For
ny assignment of income and risk profiles to individuals,
e can take that assignment as the status quo and consider
he social welfare impact of policy interventions relative to
hat baseline.
As a notational matter, we’ll also denote SVRRi for a
eneric SWF  W(·) as Si; and SVRRi for WU , WEAP , and WEPP







Using the definition of SVRRi and of the SWFs (Defini-





























25 Assume that a policy intervention changes individual i’s current sur-
ival probability by pi; her survival probability in period t by pi t , with
 > Ai; and her income in period t by yi t , with t ≥ Ai . Then, by the total-





































26 We remind the reader that proofs of numbered propositions can be
ound in the on-line Appendix.
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We can provide intuitive explanations for these formu-
las, beginning with the utilitarian SVRRi. Observe that SUi is
equal to the difference between (1) individual i’s expected












(t), and (2) her realized lifetime
well-being if she dies during the current period (does not
survive it), i.e., UO
i
(Ai − 1).
Consider the simple case in which individual i would die
for certain during the current period, absent governmen-
tal intervention, and intervention ensures that she survives
the period. In this case, clearly, the change in utilitarian
social welfare that results from the intervention is the
difference between individual i’s expected lifetime well-
being conditional on surviving the current period, and her
realized lifetime well-being if she dies during the current
period. For short, let’s term this difference the “utilitarian
gain from saving individual i.”
More generally, consider a policy which increases indi-
vidual i’s current survival probability by pi. The change
in utilitarian social welfare that results from the pi
increase is just pi multiplied by the utilitarian gain
from saving individual i. Thus SU
i
, the marginal change
in utilitarian social welfare per unit of current-period
risk reduction for individual i, is nothing other than
−UO
i











(t): the utilitarian gain from
saving individual i.
The formula for the ex ante prioritarian SVRRi, SEAPi ,
is the utilitarian SVRRi multiplied by a weighting factor,
g′(VO
i
). This weighting factor is a function of the individual’s
expected lifetime well-being, and decreases as expected
lifetime well-being increases. It reflects the priority given
by the ex ante prioritarian SWF  to individuals at lower lev-
els of expected lifetime well-being.
Finally, the formula for the ex post prioritarian SVRRi,
SEPP
i
, is the same as that for the utilitarian SVRRi, except that
transformed lifetime well-being, g(Ui), is substituted for
lifetime well-being Ui. Consider the case in which individ-
ual i would die for certain during the current period, absent
governmental intervention, and intervention ensures that
she survives the period. In this case, the change in ex
post prioritarian social welfare that results from the inter-
vention is the difference between individual i’s expected












(t)), and her real-
ized transformed lifetime well-being if she dies during the
current period, g(UO
i
(Ai − 1)). For short, let’s term this dif-
ference the “ex post prioritarian gain from saving individual
i.”
More generally, consider a policy which increases indi-
vidual i’s current survival probability by pi. The change
in ex post prioritarian social welfare that results from the
pi increase is just pi multiplied by the ex post prioritar-
ian gain from saving individual i. Thus SEPP
i
, the marginal


















































our analysis in Sections 3 and 4 below will demonstrate.
If we posit a perfect tax system that redistributes
income so as to equalize individuals’ expected marginal
function of individual i’s risk profile and income profile, as in note 27
immediately above. Vi = Vi(pi (1), ..., pi(T); yi (1), ..., yi(T)). Then VSLi =.D. Adler, M. Ferranna, J.K. Hammitt, and N. Treich 
urrent-period risk reduction for individual i, is nothing
ther than the ex post prioritarian gain from saving indi-
idual i.
Note that our assumption that u(yi(t)) > 0 for all i, t—it







> 0 for all i. Risk reduc-
ion is always a social benefit—whether social benefits are
alculated using a utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, or ex post
rioritarian SWF.
It would be of interest to consider the relation between
VRRi as defined here and the partial derivative of the SWF
ith respect to future survival probability. Given space con-
traints, we do not address this topic, and instead focus in
his Article on how the marginal social welfare impact of
hanges to current survival probability varies among indi-
iduals as a function of their ages, income profiles, and risk
rofiles.
.4. Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) and the value of
tatistical life (VSL)
BCA is an evaluation methodology that assigns a score
o each policy by summing up individuals’ monetary equiv-
lents for that policy. (Adler, 2012, pp. 88–114; Boadway,
016). In the model here, MEi(P), individual i’s monetary
quivalent for policy P, is the change to her current status
uo income that equalizes her expected utility as between
he policy and the status quo. We  use B(·) to denote the BCA
ethodology. B(P) is the score assigned by BCA to policy P:
he sum of monetary equivalents for P.
efinition 3. Benefit-Cost Analysis: B(P) =
∑N
i=1MEi(P),
ith MEi(P) as formally defined in the accompanying
ootnote.27
The value of statistical life (VSL) is standardly defined as
he marginal rate of substitution between an individual’s
aterial resources (wealth, income, or consumption) and
urvival probability. (Eeckhoudt and Hammitt, 2001; Evans
nd Smith, 2006; Kaplow, 2005; Hammitt, 2007.)
Consistent with this general approach, we define VSLi
n our model as follows.efinition 4. The Value of Statistical Life (VSLi): VSLi =
∂Vi/∂pi(Ai)
∂Vi/∂yi(Ai)
, with these partial derivatives evaluated at i’s sta-
us quo risk profile and income profile.28
27 Let Vi(pi(1), ..., pi(T); yi(1), ..., yi(T)) denote individual
’s  expected lifetime utility as a function of risk pro-
le  (pi(1), . . .,  pi(T)) and income profile (yi(1), . . .,  yi(T)).






i(t; Ai)ˇtu(yi(t)), with i(t; Ai) =
∏t
s=Ai
pi(s). Then MEi(P) = y







(Ai − 1),  yOi (Ai) + y,  yOi (Ai +
),  ..., yO
i




ote that MEi(P), thus defined, is individual i’s “equivalent variation” for
olicy P. Sometimes, BCA is defined instead as the sum of “compensating
ariations.” (Boadway, 2016; Freeman, 2003, ch. 3.) There are theoretical
dvantages to conceptualizing monetary equivalents for purposes of BCA
s  equivalent variations rather than compensating variations. (Adler et al.,
014, n. 8.) However, that choice is not significant for purpose of this Arti-
le.  Whether monetary equivalents are defined as equivalent variations
r  compensating variations, VSLi = ∂B∂pi (Ai ) . See Appendix.
28 To state this definition more formally, let Vi be expressed as a
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The relation between VSLi and B is directly analogous to
the relation between SVRRi and W.  Just as SVRRi = ∂W∂pi(Ai) ,
so VSLi = ∂B∂pi(Ai) . This was  true in the one-period model ana-
lyzed in Adler et al. (2014), and remains true in the lifetime
model under consideration here.




status quo income and risk profiles.
Intuitively, VSLi is the marginal change in the sum of
monetary equivalents per unit of current risk reduction for
individual i, just as SVRRi is the marginal change in social
welfare per unit of current risk reduction for individual i.
Assume that a policy intervention changes individual i’s
current survival probability by pi. While the change in
social welfare resulting from this risk change is approxi-
mately SVRRi × pi, the change in the sum of monetary
equivalents is approximately VSLi × pi.29
From Definition 4, plus the formulas above for Vi and the
utilitarian SVRRi, it is straightforward to derive that VSLi
equals the utilitarian SVRRi (SUi ) divided by the expected
marginal utility of i’s current income.









Given the formula for VSLi stated in Proposition 2b, it
can be observed that the comparative statics of VSLi and the
utilitarian SVRRi will be the same in the special case where
all individuals in the status quo have the same expected
marginal utility of current income. In that case, the denomi-
nator in this formula will be the same for all individuals, and
VSLi then equals SUi multiplied by a common positive con-
stant. In general, however, relative to a generic status quo,





















Adler et al. (2014), using a one-period model, defined VSL as the marginal
rate of substitution between wealth and survival probability. In the multi-
period model with myopic consumption that we use in this Article, an
individual’s wealth in each period is zero—she consumes what she earns
and saves nothing—and so VSL is here defined as the marginal rate of
substitution between income (or equivalently, consumption) and survival
probability.
29 As in note 25 above, consider a policy intervention that changes
individual i’s current survival probability by pi; her survival
probability in period t by pi t , with t > Ai; and her income in
period t by yi t , with t ≥ Ai . Again using the total-differential
approximation from calculus, B  is approximately equal to:∑
i
(

































in this equation for the partial derivative of B(·) with respect to survival
probability in a future period t—that is ∂B
∂pi (t)
, t > Ai—can also be related to
VSLi . It can be shown that each such term equals VSLi multiplied by the
marginal rate of substitution with respect to Vi between present survival
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tilities of (after-tax) present income, then the comparative
tatics of VSLi and SUi will be the same. Observe, here, that
qualizing incomes does not necessarily equalize expected
arginal utilities of after-tax present income—since, for
xample, two  individuals of the same age with the same
fter-tax present income but differing survival probabil-
ties for the current period will have different expected
arginal utilities.
A terminological note. We  use the terms “SVRRi” and
VSLi” as the names for the concepts defined in Definitions
 and 4 so as to emphasize that SVRRi and VSLi values are
ndividual-specific. In general, given two distinct individu-
ls i and j, it need not be the case that SVRRi = SVRRj and it
eed not be the case VSLi =VSLj . However, in what follows,
o as to reduce clutter, we regularly drop the “i” subscript
nd use “SVRR” and “VSL” as shorthand, respectively, for
SVRRi” and “VSLi.”
. Age effects and “priority for the young”
The effect of age on the SVRR has never been addressed
y the academic literature. In this Section, we analyze what
ur model implies with respect to age effects on SVRR as
ell as VSL by considering two individuals i and j, with
dentical risk profiles and income profiles, but the first older
han the second (Ai > Aj).
Both SVRRi and VSLi are determined by individual i’s
tatus quo income profile and risk profile. (See Proposi-
ions 1a, 1b, 1c, 2b.) Thus, in analyzing the properties of
VRRi and VSLi in this Section as well as Section 4, we  will
ot need to refer to incomes or probabilities, or to utilities
s a function of incomes and probabilities, other than sta-
us quo values. We  therefore remove the “O” superscript
n incomes, probabilities, and utilities, which is implicit.
i(t) denotes yOi (t), pi(t) denotes p
O
i
(t), Vi denotes VOi , and
o forth. Further, we often drop subscripts on incomes or
robabilities where these are the same for i and j, e.g., y(t)
ndicates yi(t) =yj(t).
.1. Age effects and the utilitarian SVRR





ndividuals of different ages (Ai > Aj) but with identical risk
nd income profiles? In other words, how does the util-
tarian gain from saving an individual depend upon her
ge?






t=Aj (t; Aj + 1)ˇ
tu(y(t)) +
(Ai; Aj + 1) − 1
)∑T
t=Ai (t; Ai + 1)ˇ
tu(y(t)).
See Appendix.)
Thus the utilitarian SVRR decreases/is unchanged/
ncreases with age iff the value of this formula is posi-
ive/zero/negative.
The first term in this formula (for short, the “duration
erm”) is positive. By increasing the younger individual’s
urrent survival probability, we increase her chance of sur-
iving the periods Aj , Aj +1, . . .,  Ai – 1 in her life, and that
robability change for each such period yields an incre-
ent in expected lifetime well-being (by increasing her
hance of accruing consumption utility with respect to that
9
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period). This increment to expected lifetime well-being
with respect to periods Aj , Aj +1, . . .,  Ai − 1 does not occur if
we increase the older individual’s survival probability, since
he has already survived those periods.
The second term in the formula above (for short, the
“risk term”) is negative. By increasing either individual’s
current survival probability, we increase that individual’s
chance of surviving periods Ai, Ai + 1, . . .,  T in his or her life,
and thereby increase his or her chance of accruing con-
sumption utility with respect to those periods. The risk
term captures the difference between the magnitude of this
benefit for the younger individual and its magnitude for the
older one. Since the older individual is sure to be alive at
the beginning of period Ai, while the younger individual is
not, this difference is negative.
Clearly, if income can increase with age, the magnitude
of the risk term may  exceed that of the duration term, and
thus the utilitarian gain from saving the older individual
may  be greater than that of saving the younger one. What
if constant income is assumed? With a constant income
profile and a constant risk profile, the duration term pre-
dominates and the utilitarian SVRR decreases with age.
More generally, it can be shown that if the income and risk
profiles are such that income does not increase with age
and survival probabilities do not increase with age, then
the utilitarian SVRR decreases with age. (See Appendix.)
3.2. Age effects and the ex ante prioritarian SVRR

















. We  noted immedi-





) equals a positive “duration” term plus








, incorporates those terms. This




) is positive. The second part of





, is a third term (“pri-
ority for the young”), which is always positive. Because
Vi > Vj (the older individual has greater expected lifetime
well-being) and g(·) is strictly concave, g′(Vi) < g′(Vj).
The intuition behind the formula is as follows. Ex ante
prioritarian social welfare, WEAP , is the sum of individuals’
transformed expected lifetime well-beings— transformed
by a strictly increasing and strictly concave g(·) function.
The effect of this transformation is to give greater social
weight to changes in expected lifetime well-being that
accrue to individuals at lower levels of expected lifetime
well-being. The differential ex-ante-prioritarian benefit of
saving a younger rather than older individual reflects the
differential gains to expected lifetime well-being of sav-




). But it also reflects the fact
that the younger individual has a lower level of expected
lifetime well-being and thus takes priority (g′(Vj) > g′(Vi)).
We now define “Priority for the Young” more formally.Definition 5. Priority for the Young: Consider any two
individuals i and j with identical risk profiles and income
profiles (pi(t) = pj(t) and yi(t) = yj(t) for all t), and such that






















































definitions, and so we don’t include the utilitarian SVRR
in the numbered propositions concerning Priority for the
Young and Ratio Priority for the Young.
31 In what follows, we  assume that SVRR values are always positive. (As







; see Section 2.3.) First, Ratio Priority for the Young implies
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≥ 0 ⇒ Sj − Si > 0. Similarly, VSL displays Priority





≥ 0 ⇒ VSLj − VSLi > 0.
Priority for the Young is a precise expression, using
he SVRR formalism, of the fair innings concept. Recall
ur informal definition of “fair innings” in the Introduc-
ion (Section 1): As between a policy that produces a given
ain in expected lifetime well-being for a younger person,
nd an otherwise-identical policy that produces the same
ain in expected lifetime well-being for an older person,
t is ethically better for society to undertake the first pol-
cy. Recall too (Section 3.1) that the utilitarian SVRRi, SUi , is
qual to the per-unit gain to expected lifetime well-being
rom reducing i’s current fatality risk. If i’s current survival
robability increases by pi, his expected lifetime well-
eing increases by pi × SUi .
If SVRRi for a given SWF  W(·) displays Priority for the
oung, then it never assigns a smaller or equal value to
isk reduction for the younger individual if the utilitarian
isk-reduction value is larger for the younger than for the
lder individual. (If the SWF  displays Priority for the Young,




> 0 ⇒ Sj − Si > 0.) Further, if the
tilitarian risk-reduction values are equal, the SWF  places
 larger value on risk reduction for the younger individual.





= 0 ⇒ Sj − Si > 0.).
roposition 3a. The Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR displays
riority for the Young.
We can illustrate why ex ante prioritarianism satisfies
riority for the Young using the Bognar (2015) thought
xperiment presented in the Introduction. Consider two
atients, a younger patient j and an older patient i, who
re respectively at the beginning of periods two  and three
f their lives. The maximum lifespan is three periods. The
atients have a common risk profile, with p2 the common
urvival probability for period two and p3 the common
urvival probability for period three. Assume also that the
atients are equally well off, materially. Each faces the
ame, constant, income profile, with period utility normal-
zed to 1 and a zero utility discount rate.
Finally, assume that p3 is close to zero, so that SUj ≈ SUi =
 (as shown in note 30). Thus, if we have one dose of a drug
hat can increase a patient’s current survival probability by
ome fixed increment, utilitarianism is indifferent between
iving the drug to the younger or the older patient; the util-
tarian SVRRs are approximately equal. However, we easily
btain that SEAP
j
≈ g′ (1 + p2) > SEAPi ≈ g′(2), by the concav-
ty of g(·).30 Ex ante prioritarianism tells us to give the drug
o the younger individual, who has a lower expected life-
ime well-being (it is uncertain whether she will survive
he second period, while the older patient will definitely
30 Vj , the expected lifetime well-being of the younger individual, is (1 −
2) (1) + p2(1 − p3) (2) + p2p3(3) = 1 + p2 + p2p3; while Vi , the expected










= g ′(1 + p2 + p2p3)(1 +
3)and SEAPi = g ′(2 + p3).
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live at least two  periods). Ex ante prioritarianism gives
greater weight to a given increase in expected lifetime
well-being if it accrues to an individual at a lower level of
expected lifetime well-being, and so the younger patient
takes priority.
Not only does ex ante prioritarianism satisfy Priority for
the Young. We can prove a logically stronger result, namely
that the relative social value of risk reduction for young
versus old individuals is always greater with ex ante prior-









If utilitarianism prefers to reduce the younger individual’s
risk (the utilitarian gain from saving her is greater), ex
ante prioritarianism has a yet greater degree of priority
for the young. If utilitarianism is indifferent (the utilitar-
ian gains are equal), ex ante prioritarianism gives priority
to the young. Finally, although ex ante prioritarianism may
prefer to reduce the risk of the older individual (if the util-
itarian gain from saving her is sufficiently greater), in this
case it always gives less priority to the older individual than
utilitarianism does.
Definition 6. Ratio Priority for the Young: Consider
any two  individuals i and j with identical risk profiles and
income profiles (pi(t) = pj(t) and yi(t) = yj(t) for all t), and
such that Ai > Aj . SVRR for a given SWF  W(·) displays “Ratio
Priority for the Young” iff the following is true for any such
i and j: (Sj/Si) > (SUj /S
U
i
). Similarly, VSL displays Ratio Pri-
ority for the Young iff the following is true for any such i




Proposition 3b. The Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR displays
Ratio Priority for the Young.
Note that Ratio Priority for the Young is a logically
stronger property than Priority for the Young. If SVRR for a
given W(·) satisfies Ratio Priority for the Young, then nec-
essarily it satisfies Priority for the Young; but the converse
is not true.31
Both Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the
Young are defined relative to a utilitarian baseline. It is
an immediate logical consequence of these definitions that
the utilitarian SVRR displays neither property. This is not a
mathematical result, but simply the logical upshot of ourfor the Young, Sj/Si>1. Thus Sj − Si>0. (2) If SUj − SUi = 0, then SUj /SUi = 1. By
Ratio Priority for the Young, Sj/Si>1. Thus Sj − Si>0.
Second, Priority for the Young does not imply Ratio Priority for the Young.




< 0. In this case, Priority
for  the Young places no constraint on the relative magnitudes of Sj and Si .




It’s also true, by directly parallel reasoning, that Ratio Priority for the
Young as defined with respect to VSL is logically stronger than Priority for
the Young as defined with respect to VSL. If VSL were to satisfy the first, it
would satisfy the second, but not vice versa. As it happens, however, VSL





















































Because Ratio Priority for the Young is a logically
stronger property than Priority for the Young33 —if VSL
32 Let Gj and Gi denote each individual’s expected transformed lifetime.D. Adler, M.  Ferranna, J.K. Hammitt, and N. Treich 
.3. Age effects and the ex post prioritarian SVRR






t=Aj (t; Aj + 1)g(U(t))
 ((Ai; Aj + 1) − 1)
∑T
t=Ai (t; Ai + 1)g(U(t))(
g(U(Ai − 1)) − g(U(Aj − 1))
)





onetheless reflects the same three factors. The first term
f the formula is a positive “duration term,” reflecting the
ncreased chance for the younger individual of surviving
eriods Aj through Ai − 1; the second term is a negative
risk term,” reflecting the chance she will not survive to
eriod Ai; and the third term is a positive “priority for the
oung” term.
We saw above that the ex ante prioritarian SVRR dis-
lays “Priority for the Young”: it prefers to reduce the
ounger individual’s risk even when utilitarianism is indif-
erent, and prefers to do so whenever utilitarianism does.
he same is true for the ex post prioritarian SWF.
roposition 3c. The Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR displays
riority for the Young.
The intuition for this result is as follows. As
xplained earlier, the ex post prioritarian SVRR, SEPP
i
=





g(Ui(t)), is the difference
etween individual i’s expected transformed lifetime
ell-being conditional on surviving the current period,
nd her transformed lifetime well-being if she does not
urvive. Equivalently, it is the expected difference between
er transformed lifetime well-being conditional on surviv-
ng the current period (given her possible lifespans if she
oes survive and their probabilities), and her transformed
ifetime well-being if she does not survive.
Consider now two individuals, one (j) younger than the
econd (i), with a common risk and income profile. The ex
ost prioritarian SWF  places less value on a risk reduction
or i than for j because i’s lifetime well-being if she dies
uring the current period, U(Ai − 1), is greater than j’s if she
ies during the current period, U(Aj − 1)—and thus the very
ame increase in lifetime well-being for the two individu-
ls translates into a smaller change in transformed lifetime
ell-being for i. Assume that i, if she survives the period,
as probability  of realizing a level of lifetime well-being
hich is U greater than her level of lifetime well-being
f she dies now. And assume that the same is true for j.
he utilitarian value of a chance  of increment U  is
he same for both individuals, namely (U). The ex post
rioritarian value of a chance  for individual j of incre-
ent U  is ı
(
g(U(Aj − 1) + U) − g(U(Aj − 1))
)
, while for
 it is ı (g(U(Ai − 1) + U) − g(U(Ai − 1))).  The first value is
reater than the second by virtue of the strict concavity of
(·), because U(Aj − 1) < U(Ai − 1).
We can again use the Bognar (2015) thought experi-
ent, now to illustrate why ex post prioritarianism satisfiesriority for the Young. Following the example in Section
.2 above, we have that utilitarianism is (approximately)
ndifferent between giving the drug to the younger patient
nd giving it to the older one, if p3 is small. SUj ≈ SUi = 1.
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However, SEPP
i
= g(3) − g(2), while SEPP
j
≈ g(2) − g(1) if p3
is small.32 (If the older individual survives the period, her
expected transformed lifetime well-being is g(3); her trans-
formed lifetime well-being if she does not is g(2). If the
younger individual survives the period, her expected trans-
formed lifetime well-being, with p3 small, is approximately
g(2); her transformed lifetime well-being if she does not is
g(1).) By the concavity of g(·), g(3) − g(2) < g(2) − g(1).
We saw above that ex ante prioritarianism satisfies
not merely Priority for the Young but also the (logically
stronger) Ratio Priority for the Young. The same is true for
ex post prioritarianism.
Proposition 3d. The Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR Displays
Ratio Priority for the Young
3.4. Age effects and VSL
As is well known, the effect of age on VSL is ambigu-
ous (Aldy and Viscusi, 2007; Hammitt, 2007). In our model,
age impacts VSL via its effect on the utilitarian SVRR (the
numerator of VSL), plus an additional effect: the change in
expected marginal utility of consumption (the denomina-
tor of VSL) with age.
As throughout this Section, let i and j be two  individuals
with identical risk and income profiles, and such that Ai >














Note that the expected marginal utility of consump-
tion for the younger individual (Cj) may  be larger than for
the older individual (Ci)—which can occur if the younger
individual has less consumption and/or a greater current
survival probability. If Cj > Ci, the second term in the above





, the second term will again be negative
if Cj > Ci, and its magnitude may  exceed that of the first
term.





VSLj − VSLi > 0; and it is not necessarily the case that SUj −
SU
i
> 0 ⇒ VSLj − VSLi > 0.
Proposition 3e. VSL does not display Priority for the
Young.
In other words: BCA may  prefer a risk reduction for
the older individual even if the utilitarian gains are equal,
indeed even if the utilitarian gain from saving the youngerwell-being. Gj = (1−p2)g(1) + p2(1−p3)g(2) + p2p3g(3). Gi = (1−p3)g(2)
+ p3g(3). Then SEPPj =
∂Gj
∂p2
= [g(2) − g(1)] + p3[g(3) − g(2)], while SEPPi =
∂Gi
∂p3
= g(3) − g(2).
33 See note 31.
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Table  1





Utilitarian SVRR* — —
Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR Yes Yes
Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR Yes Yes
VSL No No














































Appendix), the following remarks may  help to explain
them. Utilitarian SVRR. The utilitarian SVRR is “history inde-
pendent.” As shown in the Appendix, the formula for SU
i
can
34 By “ambiguous” we  mean the following. The comparative statics of
SVRR or VSL with respect to a parameter of interest (present income,
future income, permanent income, age, etc.) are “ambiguous” if (a) we
can  find some combination of the other parameters and strictly increasingefined as a stronger preference for the young than the utilitarian prefer-
nce, it is true by definition that the utilitarian SVRR doesn’t have these
roperties—and so these cells in the table are left blank.
ere to display the former, it would necessarily display the
atter—the proposition that VSL fails to display Priority for
he Young implies (by contraposition) that it fails to display
atio Priority for the Young.
roposition 3f. VSL does not display Ratio Priority for the
oung.
.5. Age effects: a summary
Table 1 summarizes the results of our analysis of age
ffects on the utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post
rioritarian social values of risk reduction (SVRR), and on
SL.
One “takeaway” from our analysis is that the concept
f prioritarianism, in both its ex ante and ex post variants,
rovides a rigorous basis for the fair innings concept—as
recisely expressed by the properties Priority for the Young
nd Ratio Priority for the Young. Ex ante prioritarian social
elfare, WEAP , is the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly
oncave transformation function, g(·), applied to each
ndividual’s expected lifetime well-being. The ex ante pri-
ritarian SVRR has the priority-for-the-young properties
ecause a given increment in expected lifetime well-being
s accorded greater social weight when provided to an indi-
idual at a lower level of expected lifetime well-being. The
x post prioritarian SVRR has the priority-for-the-young
roperties for a different reason. The ex post prioritar-
an SWF, WEPP , applies the g(·) function to individuals’
ossible realized (not expected) lifetime well-being levels;
alculates expected transformed lifetime well-being for
ach individual; and sums across individuals. As compared
o older persons with the same risk and income profile,
ounger persons face a lottery over possible realized life-
ime well-being levels with a greater chance of lower
ealized levels, and a smaller chance of higher realized
evels. A given increment in realized lifetime well-being
s accorded greater social weight by WEPP , if provided to
omeone at a lower level of realized lifetime well-being.
For those familiar with the literature on prioritarianism
nder uncertainty, it will be striking that both ex ante pri-
ritarianism and ex post prioritarianism display Priority for
he Young and Ratio Priority for the Young. This literature
emonstrates a range of significant axiomatic differences
etween the two variants of prioritarianism (including, as
entioned above, with respect to the ex ante Pareto and
tochastic dominance axioms). (Adler, 2012 ch. 7; Adler,
019 app. J). The current analysis shows that, notwith-
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standing these important differences, the two  approaches
are alike in supporting the fair innings concept.
Our analysis also extends an important finding of Adler
et al. (2014). That article, as mentioned, used a single-
period model which was not suited to study age effects.
What it did study was  the effect of income and baseline risk
on the utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post prioritar-
ian SVRRs and on VSL. Here, Adler et al. (2014) found that
BCA and the SWF  framework value risk reduction in signif-
icantly different ways. The present analysis confirms that
finding, now with respect to age effects. By contrast with ex
ante and ex post prioritarian SVRRs, VSL does not display
Priority for the Young or Ratio Priority for the Young.
4. The effects of income and baseline risk
We  now consider how SVRR and VSL vary between indi-
viduals of the same age, but with different income or risk
profiles.
4.1. Sensitivity to income
We  consider first whether SVRR and VSL increase,
decrease, or are unchanged by a single-period increment in
income.  Two individuals i and j are identical in age (Ai = Aj),
in their risk profiles, and in their income profiles except
that yj(t) = yi(t) + y, y > 0, for some single period t. The
period in which the individuals’ incomes differ can be the
current period, in which case t =Ai = Aj , or it can be a past or
future period. We  determine whether SVRRj > SVRRi, SVRRj




We  proceed analogously for VSL.
We find as follows.
Proposition 4a. The utilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a
single-period increment to past income. It increases with a
single-period increment to present or future income.
Proposition 4b. The ex ante prioritarian SVRR decreases
with a single-period increment to past income. The effect
of a single-period increment to present income or future
income on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous.34
Proposition 4c. The ex post prioritarian SVRR decreases
with a single-period increment to past income. It increases
with a single-period increment to present or future income.
Proposition 4d. VSL is unchanged by a single-period
increment to past income. It increases with a single-period
increment to present or future income.
Although we do not prove the propositions here (seeand strictly concave u(·) and g(·) such that SVRR or VSL is increasing in the
parameter of interest, and (b) some alternative combination of the other
parameters and the same u(·) and g(·) such that SVRR or VSL is decreasing
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e restated so as to make evident that it does not depend
pon individual i’s past survival probabilities or incomes.
n particular, then, if i and j are identical except that j has





tilitarian SVRR increases with a single-period increment
o present or future income because preventing the cur-
ent death of an individual with greater present or future
ncome produces a larger gain in expected lifetime well-
eing.
Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR. Unlike the utilitarian SVRR,
he ex ante prioritarian SVRR is “history dependent.” While
he formula for SEAP
i
does not depend upon i’s past sur-
ival probabilities, it does take account of her past income.
he explanation for why the ex ante prioritarian SVRR
ecreases with a single-period increment to past income
s the following: If individuals i and j are identical except
hat j has greater past income, then preventing either of
heir deaths in the current period produces the same incre-
ent in expected lifetime well-being, but individual i has
 lower baseline level of expected lifetime well-being, thus
akes priority under WEAP .
Why  does a single-period increment to present or future
ncome have an ambiguous effect on the ex ante priori-
arian SVRR? In a nutshell, the reason is this: If the two
ndividuals are identical except that j has greater present
r future income than i, then i has a lower baseline level of
xpected lifetime well-being, so takes priority under WEAP;
ut reducing her current risk produces a smaller increase in
xpected lifetime well-being than reducing j’s current risk.
hether WEAP prefers to reduce individual i’s current risk
r instead individual j’s depends upon the concavity of the
ransformation function g(·). In particular, we  show that
f g(·) is such that the coefficient of relative risk aversion
s always less than or equal to 1, a single-period incre-
ent to present or future income will increase the ex ante
rioritarian SVRR.
Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR. The ex post prioritarian
VRR, too, is history dependent. The formula for SEPP
i
,
ike the formula for SEAP
i
, does not take account of i’s
ast survival probabilities but does take account of her
ast incomes. Further, like the ex ante prioritarian SVRR,
he ex post prioritarian SVRR decreases with a single-
eriod increment to past income. However, unlike its ex
nte counterpart, the ex post prioritarian SVRR always
ncreases with a single-period increment to present or
uture income.





egards sensitivity to present or future income is subtle.
he social value, as per WEPP , of preventing an individual
rom dying during the current period is the expected dif-
erence between the transformed lifetime well-being of the
onger lives she might lead were she to survive the current
eriod, and the transformed lifetime well-being of her life
ere it to end now. Increasing present or future income
ncreases that expected difference in transformed lifetime
ell-being.
VSL. Because VSL equals SU divided by the expectedi i
arginal utility of i’s current income, the comparative stat-
cs of VSL with respect to past and future income are
he same as for the utilitarian SVRR. Further, because the
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utilitarian SVRR (the numerator of VSL) is increasing in cur-
rent income, and the denominator is decreasing, VSL also
increases in current income—indeed more quickly than the
utilitarian SVRR.
Next, we consider the effect on SVRR and VSL of an
increment to permanent income.  Two  individuals i and j are
identical except that yj(t) = yi(t) + y, y  > 0, for every
period t = 1 to T. We  find as follows.
Proposition 5a. The utilitarian SVRR increases with an
increment to permanent income.
Proposition 5b. The effect of an increment to permanent
income on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous.
Proposition 5c. The effect of an increment to permanent
income on the ex post prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous.
Proposition 5d. VSL increases with an increment to per-
manent income.
4.2. Sensitivity to baseline risk
We  consider first whether SVRR and VSL increase,
decrease, or are unchanged by a single-period increment
in survival probability.  Two  individuals i and j are identi-
cal except that pj(t) = pi(t) + q,  q  > 0, for some single
period t. We determine whether SVRRj > SVRRi, SVRRj =




proceed analogously for VSL.
None of the SVRRs, nor VSL, take account of past survival
probabilities. (The ex ante prioritarian and ex post pri-
oritarian SVRRs are history-dependent because they take
account of past incomes; but their formulas do not also
depend upon past survival probabilities.) We  therefore
focus on the case of a one-period change to present survival
probability (t = Ai = Aj) or future survival probability.
Proposition 6a. The utilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a
single-period increment to present survival probability. It
increases with a single-period increment to future survival
probability.
Proposition 6b. The ex ante prioritarian SVRR decreases
with a single-period increment to present survival prob-
ability. The effect of a single-period increment to future
survival probability on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is
ambiguous.
Proposition 6c. The ex post prioritarian SVRR is
unchanged by a single-period increment to present
survival probability. It increases with a single-period incre-
ment to future survival probability.
Proposition 6d. VSL decreases with a single-period incre-
ment to present survival probability. It increases with a
single-period increment to future survival probability.
Again, see Appendix for proofs of the results. The fol-
lowing remarks may  help to explain them.
Utilitarian SVRR. The formula for SU can be rewritten
i
so that only future survival probabilities, not the current
survival probability pi(Ai), show up in the formula. An
increment to current survival probability therefore has





















































35 Except that, if g(·) has a coefficient of relative risk aversion less than.D. Adler, M. Ferranna, J.K. Hammitt, and N. Treich 
ncreasing with a one-period increment to future survival
robability because preventing a current death produces a
igger increase in expected lifetime well-being if the indi-
idual has a lower chance of dying in future periods.
Ex Ante Prioritarian SVRR. The ex ante prioritarian SVRR
s decreasing in current survival probability: An individual
ith lower present survival probability has a lower level
f expected lifetime well-being, hence takes priority under
EAP .
An individual with lower future survival probability
lso has a lower level of expected lifetime well-being,
ence also takes priority under WEAP , but reducing her
urrent risk produces a smaller increase in expected life-
ime well-being. Which effect predominates depends upon
he concavity of g(·). Hence the impact on the ex ante
rioritarian SVRR of a single-period increment to future
urvival probability is ambiguous. We demonstrate, specif-
cally, that if g(·) is such that the coefficient of relative risk
version is always less than or equal to 1, a single-period
ncrement to future survival probability will increase the
x ante prioritarian SVRR.
Ex Post Prioritarian SVRR. The ex post prioritarian SVRR is
nchanged by an increment to current survival probability.
The formula for SEPP
i
can be rewritten so that pi(Ai) drops
ut of that formula.) It is increasing with a single-period
ncrement to future survival probability. As noted earlier,
he social value, as per WEPP , of preventing an individual
rom dying during the current period is the expected dif-
erence between the transformed lifetime well-being of the
onger lives she might lead were she to survive the current
eriod, and the transformed lifetime well-being of her life
ere it to end now. Increasing future survival probability
ncreases that expected difference in transformed lifetime
ell-being.
VSL. VSL is the utilitarian SVRR divided by a denomi-
ator that increases with current survival probability, and
s independent of future survival probability. Because the
tilitarian SVRR is unchanged by a single-period increment
o current survival probability, VSL decreases with such an
ncrement. Because the utilitarian SVRR increases with a
ingle-period increment to future survival probability, VSL
lso increases with such an increment.
Next, we consider the effect on SVRR and VSL of a per-
anent increment to survival probability. Two individuals
 and j are identical except that pj(t) = pi(t) + q, q  > 0, for
very present and future period t (for every t ≥ Ai = Aj). We
nd as follows.
roposition 7a. The utilitarian SVRR increases with a per-
anent increment to survival probability.
roposition 7b. The effect of a permanent increment to
urvival probability on the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is
mbiguous.
roposition 7c. The ex post prioritarian SVRR increases
ith a permanent increment to survival probability.
roposition 7d. The effect of a permanent increment to
urvival probability on VSL is ambiguous.
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4.3. Income and baseline risk: summary
The comparative statics of the SVRRs and VSL with
respect to income and survival probability are summarized
in Table 2.
Much about this table is noteworthy. First, timing
matters. Whether individuals who  differ with respect to
income, or with respect to survival probability, have diver-
gent SVRRs or VSL depends upon whether the income
or survival probability difference occurs in the past, the
present, or the future. Consider the columns for “income:
single-period difference” and “survival probability: single-
period difference.” The following is true for each of the
three SVRRs and for VSL: (1) its comparative statics
(unchanged, increasing, decreasing, or ambiguous) are not
the same for past, current, and future-period differences
in income, and moreover (2) its comparative statics are
not the same for current and future-period differences in
survival probability.
Second, the prioritarian SVRRs, ex ante and ex post, are
history-dependent—specifically, with respect to income.
Each is decreasing with a one-period change to past
income—by contrast with the utilitarian SVRR and VSL,
which are independent of past income.
Third, this table confirms a key finding of Adler et al.
(2014), using a simpler, single-period model: the manner
in which VSL values risk reduction is not robust to a change
in social evaluation framework. VSL differs, in some signif-
icant way, from each of the SVRRs. VSL and the utilitarian
SVRR have the same comparative statics with respect to
income, but not survival probability. VSL and the prioritar-
ian SVRRs have different comparative statics with respect
to both income and survival probability.35
Fourth, the choice within the prioritarian family,
between ex ante and ex post prioritarian approaches, is
seen to be significant. The ex ante prioritarian SVRR is
decreasing in current survival probability and ambigu-
ous with respect to future survival probability, while
the ex post prioritarian SVRR is independent of cur-
rent survival probability and increasing in future survival
probability. Both SVRRs are decreasing in past income,
but: the ex ante prioritarian SVRR is ambiguous with
respect to current and future income, while the ex post
prioritarian SVRR is increasing with current and future
income.36
This table, of course, concerns comparative statics: the
direction of impact on VSL and the SVRRs of changes in
risk and survival probability. It doesn’t show the magnitude
of impact—another type of difference between the various
approaches. This difference will emerge in the following
section, where we  empirically estimate VSL and the SVRRs
for the U.S. population.or equal to one, the comparative statics of the ex ante prioritarian SVRR
with respect to survival probability are the same as VSL.
36 See Adler and Treich (2017), finding significant differences between
ex  ante and ex post prioritarianism in a model of intergenerational con-
sumption allocation.
M.D. Adler, M.  Ferranna, J.K. Hammitt, and N. Treich Journal of Health Economics 75 (2021) 102412
Table  2













Increasing Current period: Unchanged
Future period: Increasing
Increasing
Ex  Ante Prioritarian SVRR Past period: Decreasing
Current period: Ambiguous*
Future period: Ambiguous*
Ambiguous Current period: Decreasing
Future period: Ambiguous*
Ambiguous
Ex  Post Prioritarian SVRR Past period: Decreasing
Current period: Increasing
Future period: Increasing
Ambiguous Current period: Unchanged
Future period: Increasing
Increasing
VSL Past period: Unchanged
Current period: Increasing













































* The ex ante prioritarian SVRR increases with a single-period increme
uture survival probability, if g(·)  is such that its coefficient of relative risk
. SVRRs and VSL for the U.S. population
In this Section, we illustrate the SVRR and VSL concepts,
nd estimate their relative magnitudes, by calculating SVRR
nd VSL for cohorts of individuals characterized by vary-
ng risk profiles, income profiles and ages. The income and
urvival data for this exercise derive from the actual U.S.
opulation. The U.S. Census Bureau collects data on the
ncome distribution by age range. We  used this to estimate
he percentiles of the income distribution for each age.
ssuming zero mobility (movement across percentiles), we
etermined a lifetime income profile for the 10th, 30th, 50th,
0th, and 90th percentiles of the U.S. income distribution.
The lifetime risk profile for each of these five percentiles
as based upon the actual U.S. population survival curve,
nd then adjusted to reflect income differences in life
xpectancy.37
We  calculated the utilitarian SVRR, ex ante and ex post
rioritarian SVRRs, and VSL by age for each of the five per-
entiles. As per the analysis in Sections 2,3 and 4, we did so
n the assumption that an individual’s annual consumption
n a given year is just her income. A logarithmic utility func-
ion was used.38 The utility discount rate was set to 0. For
37 Specifically, data on the U.S. income distribution was  taken
rom the Current Population Survey (CPS) income tables. See
ttps://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/
ps-pinc.html. We used the table PINC 01 1 1 1 (total work experience,
oth sexes, all races) for 2016. A fourth degree polynomial in age was
tted to the data. We assume that income for ages 20−24 is the same
s for ages 25−30 and that income for ages 75−100 is the same as for
ges 70−74. The U.S. population survival curve was taken from the life
ables compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. See
ttps://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/life tables.htm. We used the 2014
ife tables (National Vital Statistics Reports, vol. 66, no. 4, August 24,
017).
 lifetime risk profile for the five percentiles was determined as follows.
e  adjusted the U.S. population survival curve, as taken from the life table,
y multiplying the annual mortality risk for each age by a scaling factor to
eflect the individual’s income. These scaling factors were, respectively,
.5, 1.2, 1, 0.9, and 0.7 for, respectively, the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th
ercentiles of income. The scaling factors were taken from Adler (2017,
ppendix C), who  in turn estimated them to match findings by Chetty et al.
2016) regarding differences in life expectancy across income classes.
38 Specifically, u(c) = ln c − ln czero , czero = $1000, which is roughly the
orld Bank level of extreme poverty. See Adler (2017, appendix C).
15rrent or future income, and increases with a single-period increment to
n is always less than or equal to 1.
the prioritarian SVRRs, we used an “Atkinson” (isoelastic)
SWF  with both a moderate inequality-aversion parameter
( = 1) and a higher such parameter ( = 2). This yields four
different prioritarian SVRRs (namely ex post or ex ante,
with  = 1 or 2). (On the attractive axiomatic properties
of the Atkinson subfamily of prioritarian SWFs, see Adler,
2012, ch. 5; Adler, 2019, pp. 154–58.)
The panels in Fig. 1 display the SVRRs and VSL as a func-
tion of age, for each of the five percentiles. The results are
normalized so that 1 represents the SVRR or VSL for a 60
year old, median income individual.
As the panels show, the utilitarian SVRR decreases with
age within each percentile (even though this is not theoreti-
cally required—see Section 3.1). The prioritarian SVRRs also
decrease with age within each percentile (as is required by
Priority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the Young given
that the utilitarian SVRR does39).
The utilitarian SVRR increases with income: at every
age, individuals in higher income percentiles have larger
SVRRs. This is reversed for the prioritarian SVRRs with
 = 2; at every age, SVRR decreases with income.  = 1
is an intermediate case, in which the utilitarian prefer-
ence for reducing the risk of those with higher income is
almost neutralized but not reversed. Note here that the
lines displaying the ex ante and ex post prioritarian SVRR
as a function of age are virtually the same for all income
percentiles. Thus the prioritarian SVRRs with moderate
inequality aversion conform to widely held views regard-
ing lifesaving policies, namely that the young should take
priority but income should make no difference.40
39 Assume that the utilitarian SVRR decreases with age among a group
of  individuals with the same risk and income profile. That is, for every













. Because Ratio Priority for the Young implies
Priority for the Young (see note 31), this also follows from Ratio Priority
for the Young.
40 Dolan et al. (2005, p. 202), reviewing the survey literature regarding
the public’s preferences for the allocation of health care, finds that “most
studies suggest that health gains to the old are weighted less.” Dolan et al.
find some studies in which respondents prefer to allocate resources to
those in lower socioeconomic groups. However, Emanuel et al. (2020, p.
2051), discussing the allocation of scarce medical resources in the Covid-







Fig. 1. SVRRs and VSL by Age and 
VSL decreases with age for individuals above 40. At
arlier ages, for some income percentiles, VSL displays
he inverted U (“hump”) shape often described in the lit-
9 pandemic, and citing the public health literature, write: “Consensus
xists that an individual person’s wealth should not determine who lives
r  dies.”
16Percentile for the U.S. Population.
erature. (Aldy and Viscusi, 2007; Hammitt, 2007; Viscusi,
2018, ch. 5).
The most striking difference between VSL and all the
SVRRs concerns income effects: VSL increases with income
at all ages, and much more steeply than even the utilitarian
SVRR. This can be observed in Fig. 1, and is displayed very
clearly in Fig. 2, which shows the ratio between SVRR or
VSL at the 90th and 10th income percentiles as a function of
age. That ratio is between 0.5 and 3 for all the SVRRs, while
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an empirical exercise, we  confirm this finding.
Moreover, we show that the “fair innings” concept, pop-
ular in the public health literature, has a firm, formal basisFig. 3. Fair Innings Premium (percent).
enerally exceeds 20 for VSL. (In Fig. 2, the abbreviation “U”
ndicates the utilitarian SVRR; “EAP 1” and “EAP 2” the ex
nte prioritarian SVRR with  = 1 and 2, respectively; and
EPP 1” and “EPP 2” the ex post prioritarian SVRR with 
 1 and 2, respectively. The “EAP” and “EPP” abbreviations
re also used in Fig. 3.)
Our exercise here also sheds light on the U.S. govern-
ent’s practice of employing a single, population-average
SL to value risk reduction (Robinson, 2007). Such an
pproach is not only inconsistent with the theory of
CA—as Fig. 1 shows, VSL varies by age and income—but
lso with the SWF  framework. All of the SVRRs vary, at least,
y age, and some by both age and income.
Finally (see Fig. 3) we estimate a “fair innings premium.”
ecall that both ex ante prioritarian and ex post priori-
arian SVRRs have the property of Ratio Priority for the
oung: the ratio of prioritarian SVRRs, between a younger
nd older person with the same lifetime income and risk
rofile, is always larger than the ratio of utilitarian SVRRs.
ig. 3 shows the magnitude of this difference in ratios. For
ndividuals of the median income profile and associated
isk profile, we calculate the percentage by which the ratio
17 SVRRs and VSL at 10th Percentile Income by Age.
between the ex ante or ex post prioritarian SVRR of an
individual of each age and a 60-year-old’s ex ante or ex
post prioritarian SVRR exceeds the comparable ratio for the
utilitarian SVRR.41
6. Conclusion
This Article has undertaken an extensive analysis of the
social value of risk reduction (SVRR). SVRR is the linch-
pin concept for applying a social welfare function (SWF)
to one major policy domain: fatality risk regulation. SVRRi
is defined as ∂W
∂pi
. It is the marginal change in social value, as
determined by SWF  W(·), per unit of risk reduction for indi-
vidual i. We  investigate SVRR for three major SWFs (utili-
tarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post prioritarian), using
a lifetime model that allows us to differentiate individuals
by age, lifetime risk profile, and lifetime income profile.
Economists have intensively investigated the SWF
framework in certain policy arenas, such as taxation and
climate policy. However, the application of SWFs to the
domain of risk regulation has been little studied. Our
analysis demonstrates, in detail, how the social weight
placed upon a reduction in a given individual’s fatality risk
depends upon the functional form of the SWF. In their
comparative statics with respect to income and baseline
risk, the three SVRRs differ significantly from each other.
At the same time, each of the SVRRs deviates substan-
tially from VSL—the valuation concept for risk reduction
that is used by benefit-cost analysis (BCA), currently the
dominant methodology in governmental practice and in
applied economics. In a nutshell, then, our analysis shows
that a rigorous intellectual apparatus with deep roots in
welfare economics—the SWF  framework—values individ-













































.D. Adler, M. Ferranna, J.K. Hammitt, and N. Treich 
ithin welfare economics. Specifically, both the ex ante pri-
ritarian and ex post prioritarian SVRRs satisfy axioms of
riority for the Young and Ratio Priority for the Young. In
ffect, a younger person takes priority over an older per-
on with respect to risk reduction even when the gains
n expected lifetime well-being are equal. (By contrast,
CA does not support the fair innings concept; a younger
ndividual may  have a lower VSL even when the gains
o expected lifetime well-being are equal.) As far as we
re aware, this Article is the first to provide a theoretical
nterpretation of “fair innings” using the tools of welfare
conomics.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be
ound, in the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/
.jhealeco.2020.102412.
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